Introduction:
Russia is the 11th largest economy in the world and has been moving towards becoming an increasingly market-oriented economy for the last 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As one of the market leaders in the global energy expert industry, the Russian economy remains very sensitive in terms of swinging in international commodity pricing (Ngoc et al.2022). The country conducted a war against its neighbour nation Ukraine in 2022. As a consequence of this war, Russia got hit by multiple sanctions including some trade restrictions as well as economic penalties which all hurt the Russian economy and its GDP to a larger extent as noticed by a contraction of the Russian Gross Domestic Product as opposed to its growth (Orhan, 2022).
Russia-Ukraine war and its impacts on both the countries and the entire world:
The war between Ukraine and Russia started back in February 2014 when Russian forces wearing disguises invaded the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. This battle extended till April 2014 when the local proxy troops and Russians ended up seizing territory in the Donbas area of Ukraine. Over fourteen thousand people were killed in this battle across eastern Ukraine (Ociepa-Kicińska and Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, 2022). On 24th February 2022, Russia announced a full-scale war against Ukraine. Even though the Russian forces experienced potential gains in the initial phase of this battle, the Ukrainians tended to some major cities including Kyiv being prepared for their counterattack against Russia (Haque et al.2022). This devastating battle between two global forces has continued longer than anyone could have expected. Both on the American and European ends, the ongoing continual funding of Ukraine over a larger period going forward has increasingly been challenging to conceive of in political terms. Then again, there have been an increasing number of people losing their lives in this area. Mauripol, the Ukrainian city faced severe damage with the increased street art battle due to this war (Ben Hassen and El Bilali, 2022).
The Russian economy primarily is famous for exporting energy products. Besides wheat, coal and aluminium, natural gas and crude oil remain the most crucial export products from the country (Kuzemko et al.2022). Russia remains one of the biggest natural gas exporters in the world and these industries contribute potentially to the GDP of the country by playing a critical role in accelerating the global energy procurement. In 2022, in the face of its war with Ukraine, a majority of nations and communities within the states ended up imposing strict rules and sanctions resulted in impacting potentially the overall Russian economy (Lim et al.2022). These sanctions included restrictions in the economic sectors of the country, the freezing of international resources of private sector ventures and Russian enterprises abroad and export restrictions (Bin-Nashwan et al.2022). The reserves of the central bank in Russia stored overseas were also frozen to a larger extent making accessibility to foreign markets very difficult. Only the member countries of the EU have adopted most of the sanctions packages. The United States of America ended up banning all imports of natural gas, metals, coal and crude oil from Russia whereas a ban on crude oil import from Russia in different European nations remained limited only to the sea routes. The restrictions in different industries and sectors were highly expensive resulting in the closing of several foreign companies or switching their businesses only in the domestic market (Ociepa-Kicińska and Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, 2022).
According to the estimation, the exports from Russia have already declined to 20 years lower in May 2022. Then again, the prices of gas and oil have increased so exponentially in the past couple of years that the revenue generated from these sections continues generating an increasing additional profitability in billions. Russia has not been publishing any figures and that is why it is becoming challenging to calculate the exact impact of the war on the Russian economy (Haque et al.2022). Be that as it may, in the face of this war, Russia has been thriving and becoming economically independent continuing to promote the growth of technologies and markets that are considerably less reliable on international markets and imports. Russian President Vladimir Putin has now been looking forward to a developing business relationship with the former Commonwealth of Independent States such as the former republics of the Soviet Union and also with China aiming at enriching the Russian economy after this war (Bin-Nashwan et al.2022). The long-term impact of this devastating war between Russia and Ukraine and the sanctions associated with this war on the larger economy of Russia has not yet been foreseeable. It is worth mentioning in this context that the brain drain only is going to impact the national economy of the country to a larger extent (Kuzemko et al.2022).
The solution to the war between Russia and Ukraine:
Ukraine should not be pressured, indirectly or directly to go into a negotiation, rather Kyiv should be allowed to participate in the war to resolve it before the negotiation of peace. This is going to grant the success of Russia by encouraging more of these types of invasions in future. The Western backers of Ukraine should consider that territorial concessions by this country including Crimea would not be an effective course of action, rather Moscow is going to be reassured that war is the right solution by granting the wishes of Russia (Ociepa-Kicińska and Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, 2022). There should be a genuine protection guarantee provided to Ukraine for the safety of its future. Neutrality remained the status of this country before this war and is incapable of providing such assurance. One this that has been proven by this battle is that real protection against a large power like Russia only exists in NATO whereas with the total transformation of Ukraine from a past Soviet Republic to a free and dull member within the transatlantic nation (Haque et al.2022). The membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO must be prioritized to end this battle. On the other hand, the Western backers of Ukraine should get rid of their fear related to handily defeating Russia while the risks associated with this defeat would far be exceeded by that of the victory of Russia or an unclear solution to the battle (Bin-Nashwan et al.2022).
Furthermore, assignment help Russia and Ukraine is not supposed to let the possibility of political turbulence in Russia stop it from driving home its benefits. Rather the attempted Wagner Group Mutiny in June 2023 indicated that the internal turbulence in Russia could be a tactical benefit for Ukraine. Even though the disintegration of the state would ne improbable even if Russia losses the battle, the revolt spoke volumes for how the battle ended up shuddering the Russian Federation (Kuzemko et al.2022). The financial assistance for Ukraine should considered as an investment in ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic and an investment which is going yield potential returns in terms of neutralizing one of the most acute security threats (Orhan, 2022). The government of the Western country must make all their electorates clear about what their investment is going to buy and whether they need to adapt the strategies of public interactions challenging narratives across the fiscal investment associated with empowering Ukraine (Liadze et al.2023).
NATO is responsible for increasing the manufacturing of different weapons, munitions and other systems urgently with the purpose of matching the consumption rate across Ukraine which is going to support the survival of the armed forces of Ukraine in this existing battle while also enabling them to augment as well as replenishing stockpiles around NATO in preparedness for a larger duration of military concern and the probability of large-scale warfare (Ngoc et al.2022). Furthermore, NATO must also concentrate on fostering collaboration with the global defence supply and with the help of the European Union, the eradication of systemic hinders such as protectionism obstructing multinational defence orders. One of the critical requirements for justice for the atrocities and war crimes of Russia should be regarded in order to establish a settlement with Moscow. Most essentially, Ukraine requires continuous support with its large caseload related to battle-related proceedings along with the development of a specific tribunal for the crime of aggression of Russia (Liadze et al.2023). Eventually, the needful support for winning this batter would be required to allow a prospect of justice to be delivered. Both the financial as well as economic sanctions should constantly be honed and refined for the sake of ensuring that they stay effective. The policies enforced in these regions are supposed to be informed by a consideration that Russia gets engaged in a larger endeavour of getting around restrictions. Sanctions are essential in imposing an expenditure on Russia they are going to play a crucial role in limiting the capability of the military-industrial complex of the country in terms of redeveloping offensive defence capacity eroded in this battle.
Conclusion:
At the end of this blog report, it can be concluded that it is important that the Western nations and NATO afield further accepting and recognizing the outcome of this war of Russia against Ukraine remains of potential determinant of the security and safety of their future. Any durable, genuine strategy in place may be applied following the end of hostilities in favor of Ukraine. Furthermore, it should support the principles of respect for the sovereign independence of the nation. A continual and sustainable restraint of Russia following this batter remains critical to ensured establishing and sustaining global peace.
References:
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Bin-Nashwan, S.A., Hassan, M.K. and Muneeza, A., 2022. Russia–Ukraine conflict: 2030 Agenda for SDGs hangs in the balance. International Journal of Ethics and Systems, 40(1), pp.3-16.
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